June 2013
24 posts
Fortunately for the Romans, their innate bellicosity was, however, to a large extent counterbalanced by another, closely related, feature of tribal societies — disunity, caused by fierce feuds, both between tribes and within them. At the end of the first century, the historian and commentator Tacitus fully appreciated the importance for the Romans of Germanic disunity. He hoped ‘that it may last and persist amongst the barbarians that if they can not love us, at least they should hate themselves … for Fortune can give us no better gift than discord amongst our enemies’. Similarly, at a slightly earlier date, the philosopher Seneca remarked on the exceptional valour and love of warfare of the barbarians, and pointed to the great danger that there would be for Rome if these strengths were ever joined by reason (ratio) and discipline (disciplina).” —Bryan Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization
Suffering has long been a component of many religious traditions, and often practiced in wild, forbidding places. Milarepa, the eleventh-century Tibetan mystic, spent months wandering in the Himalayas, protected only by a thin cotton sheet and living off nettles. Manchurian shamans of the ninth century tested themselves by swimming underneath the ice of a frozen river, between air holes cut far apart in the ice. Missing a hole meant death.
The Tamang shamans, or bombos, of Nepal completed their initiation with trances brought about by fasting for seven days in a gufa, a barrel set high on a pole. In the first century A.D., Simeon the Stylite of Syria spent thirty-three years perched on a high pillar and Saint John of Rila lived much of his life in caves and among tree roots on the slopes of his namesake mountain in Bulgaria.
Early last century, Igjugarjuk, a member of the Caribou Inuit tribe in Northern Canada, was dragged on a sled into the wilderness by his teacher, Perqanaq, and sealed inside an igloo. For a month. In the depth of winter. Igjugarjuk wanted to become an angakoq, or shaman, and this was his initiation, which he later described to the Danish ethnographer Knut Rasmussen. During the thirty days of dark solitude he had no clothing, no food, barely any water, and only a piece of hide to lie on. His suffering was so great, he said, that at times he ‘died a little.’ But it was only the beginning of a lifetime of fasting and privation, which, he learned, were essential to accessing shamanic powers.
‘All the true wisdom is only to be found far from the dwellings of man, in the great solitudes, and it can only be attained through suffering,’ Igjugarjuk told Rasmussen. ‘Suffering and privation are the only things that can open the mind of man to that which is hidden from his fellows.’
” —Maria Coffey, Explorers of the Infinite : The Secret Spiritual Lives of Extreme Athletes
(A fantastic book, highly recommended)
Now the return which idealists propose is not a voyage backward through time but a return to center, which must be conceived metaphysically or theologically. They are seeking the one which endures and not the many which change and pass, and this search can be only described as looking for the truth. They are making the ancient affirmation that there is a center of things, and they point out that every feature of modern disintegration is a flight toward periphery. It is expressible, also, as a movement from unity to individualism. In proportion as man approaches the outer rim, he becomes lost in details, and the more he is preoccupied with details, the less he can understand them.” —Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences
[The] story of man’s passage from religious or philosophical transcendentalism has been told many times, and, since it has usually been told as a story of progress, it is extremely difficult today to get people in any number to see contrary implications. Yet to establish the fact of decadence is the most pressing duty of our time because, until we have demonstrated that cultural decline is a historical fact — which can be established — and that modern man has about squandered his estate, we cannot combat those who have fallen prey to hysterical optimism.
Such is the task, and our most serious obstacle is that people traveling this downward path develop an insensibility which increases with their degradation. Loss is perceived most clearly at the beginning; after habit becomes implanted, one beholds the anomalous situation of apathy mounting as the moral crisis deepens. It is when the first faint warnings come that one has the best chance to save himself; and this, I suspect, explains why medieval thinkers were extremely agitated over questions which seem to us today without point or relevance. If one goes on, the monitory voices fade out, and it is not impossible for him to reach a state in which his entire moral orientation is lost. Thus in the face of the enormous brutality of our age we seem unable to make appropriate response to perversions of truth and acts of bestiality. Multiplying instances show complacency in the presence of contradiction which denies the heritage of Greece, and a callousness to suffering which denies the spirit of Christianity. Particularly since the great wars do we observe this insentience. We approach a condition in which we shall be amoral without the capacity to perceive it and degraded without means to measure our descent.
That is why, when we reflect upon the cataclysms of the age, we are chiefly impressed with the failure of men to rise to the challenge of them. In the past, great calamities have called forth, if not great virtues, at least heroic postures; but after the awful judgments pronounced against men and nations in recent decades, we detect notes of triviality and travesty. A strange disparity has developed between the drama of these actions and the conduct of the protagonists, and we have the feeling of watching actors who do not comprehend their roles.
Hysterical optimism will prevail until the world again admits the existence of tragedy, and it cannot admit the existence of tragedy until it again distinguishes between good and evil. Hope of restoration depends upon recovery of the ‘ceremony of innocence,’ of that clearness of vision and knowledge of form which enable us to sense what is alien or destructive, what does not comport with our moral ambition. The time to seek this is now, before we have acquired the perfect insouciance of those who prefer perdition. For, as the course goes on, the movement turns centrifugal; we rejoice in our abandon and are never so full of the sense of accomplishment ag when we have struck some bulwark of our culture a deadly blow.
In view of these circumstances, it is no matter for surprise that, when we ask people even to consider the possibility of decadence, we meet incredulity and resentment. We must consider that we are in effect asking for a confession of guilt and an acceptance of sterner obligation; we are making demands in the name of the ideal or the suprapersonal, and we cannot expect a more cordial welcome than disturbers of complacency have received in any other age. On the contrary, our welcome will rather be less today, for a century and a half of bourgeois ascendancy has produced a type of mind highly unreceptive to unsettling thoughts. Added to this is the egotism of modern man, fed by many springs, which will scarcely permit the humility needed for self-criticism.
” —Richard Weaver, Ideas Have ConsequencesAfter it has been granted that man is molded entirely by environmental pressures, one is obligated to extend the same theory of causality to his institutions. The social philosophers of the nineteenth century found in Darwin powerful support for their thesis that human beings act always out of economic incentives, and it was they who completed the abolishment of freedom of the will.
The great pageant of history thus became reducible to the economic endeavors of individuals and classes; and elaborate prognoses were constructed on the theory of economic conflict and resolution. Man created in the divine image, the protagonist of a great drama in which his soul was at stake, was replaced by man the wealth-seeking and -consuming animal.
Finally came psychological behaviorism, which denied not only freedom of the will but even such elementary means of direction as instinct. Because the scandalous nature of this theory is quickly apparent, it failed to win converts in such numbers as the others; yet it is only a logical extension of them and should in fairness be embraced by the upholders of material causation. Essentially, it is a reduction to absurdity of the line of reasoning which began when man bade a cheerful goodbye to the concept of transcendence.
There is no term proper to describe the condition in which he is now left unless it be ‘abysmality.’ He is in the deep and dark abysm, and he has nothing with which to raise himself. His life is practice without theory. As problems crowd upon him, he deepens confusion by meeting them with ad hoc policies. Secretly he hungers for truth but consoles himself with the thought that life should be experimental. He sees his institutions crumbling and rationalizes with talk of emancipation. Wars have to be fought, seemingly with increased frequency; therefore he revives the old ideals — ideals which his present assumptions actually render meaningless — and, by the machinery of state, forces them again to do service. He struggles with the paradox that total immersion in matter unfits him to deal with the problems of matter.
His decline can be represented as a long series of abdications. He has found less and less ground for authority at the same time he thought he was setting himself up as the center of authority in the universe; indeed, there seems to exist here a dialectic process which takes away his power in proportion as he demonstrates that his independence entitles him to power.
” —Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences[Calvin] abominated ‘mixture,’ one of the most pejorative terms in his vocabulary; mixture in any area of experience suggested to him disorder and unintelligibility… Mixture, for Calvin, connoted ‘adulteration’ or ‘promiscuity,’ but it also set off in him deep emotional and metaphysical reverberations. He repeatedly warned against ‘mixing together things totally different.’ ‘When water is mixed with fire,’ he observed, ‘both perish.’ He abominated the papacy above all because it had, as he believed, mixed human invention with divine ordination, earthly with heavenly things…
The positive corollary of Calvin’s loathing of mixture was his approval of boundaries, which separate one thing from another. He attributed boundaries to God himself. God had established the boundaries between peoples, which should therefore remain within the space assigned them, a painful thought for an exile. ‘Just as there are in a military camp separate lines for each platoon and section,’ Calvin observed, ‘men are placed on the earth so that each nation may be content with its own boundaries.’ In this manner, he concluded, ‘God, by his providence, reduces to order that which is confused.’
” —William J. Bouwsma, John Calvin: A Sixteenth-Century PortraitMay 2013
36 posts
Hulme’s personality was a curious mixture of intellectual brilliance, aggressiveness, and sheer buffoonery. At school, when he was required to apologize to a mathematics master whom he had tormented to tears, he composed the apology in the form of an illuminated manuscript, and sang it to the astonished man. Yet he was a brilliant student, and particularly in mathematics; he won two scholarships at his school, and when he was awarded an exhibition at Cambridge, his headmaster wrote: ‘I feel they have not offered him as much as he deserves.’ But at Cambridge he took only a third in his first May examinations, and when he was sent down during his second year, for knocking down a policeman, his academic status was apparently almost as low as his disciplinary one.
In London he was equally clownish and bullying. He once held Wyndham Lewis upside down on the railings of Soho Square, and on another occasion, when Henry Simpson, Hulme’s principal opponent in the Poets’ Club, appeared at one of the Frith Street gatherings, Hulme threatened to knock him down the stairs (which were four flights long). He carried a knuckle-duster with him always, and a lady of whom he was fond recalls that when her conversation became too self-centered he would thump her on the arm with it and exclaim, ‘Forget you’re a personality!’
This last remark is significant, for Hulme’s aggressiveness was intimately connected with his theories; he seemed to desire so strenuously that people should see things as he saw them that he would assert his ideas by sheer force if necessary. With Hulme, as with many powerful men, the separation of idea and action was not natural or easy.
” —From Sam Hynes’ introduction to Further Speculations by T. E. HulmeMen who are strong are more likely to take a right-wing stance, while weaker men support the welfare state, researchers claim.
Their study discovered a link between a man’s upper-body strength and their political views. Scientists from Aarhus University in Denmark collected data on bicep size, socio-economic status and support for economic redistribution from hundreds in America, Argentina and Denmark.
Typically, Banfield explains, poverty is merely a transitory phase, restricted to the early stage in a person’s working career. ‘Permanent’ poverty, by contrast, is caused by specific cultural values and attitudes: a person’s present-orientedness or, in economic terms, its high degree of time preference (which is highly correlated with low intelligence, and both of which appear to have a common genetic basis). Whereas the former-temporarily-poor-yet-upward-moving-individual is characterized by future-orientation, self-discipline, and a willingness to forego present gratification in exchange for a better future, the latter-permanently poor-individual is characterized by present-orientation and hedonism. Writes Banfield:
If [the latter] has any awareness of the future, it is of something fixed, fated, beyond his control: things happen to him, he does not make them happen. Impulse governs his behavior, either because he cannot discipline himself to sacrifice a present for a future satisfaction or because he has no sense of the future. He is therefore radically improvident …. He works only as he must to stay alive, and drifts from one unskilled job to another, taking no interest in his work …. He is careless with his things … and, even when nearly new, they are likely to be permanently out of order for lack of minor repairs. His body, too, is a thing ‘to be worked out but not repaired.’
[…]
While high time preference is by no means equivalent with crime — it also may find expression in such perfectly legal forms as personal recklessness, insensitivity, rudeness, unreliability, or untrustworthiness — a systematic relationship between them still exists, for in order to earn a market income a certain minimum of planning, patience, and sacrifice is required: one must first work for a while before one gets paid. In contrast, specific criminal activities such as murder, assault, rape, robbery, theft, and burglary require no such discipline: the reward for the aggressor is tangible and immediate, but the sacrifice — possible punishment — lies in the future and is uncertain. Accordingly, if the degree of social time preference is increased, it can be expected that the frequency of aggressive activities will rise. As Banfield explains:
The threat of punishment at the hands of the law is unlikely to deter the present-oriented person. The gains that he expects from the illegal act are very near to the present, whereas the punishment that he would suffer — in the unlikely event of his being both caught and punished — lies in a future too distant for him to take into account. For the normal person there are of course risks other than the legal penalty that are strong deterrents: disgrace, loss of job, hardship for wife and children if one is sent to prison, and so on. The present-oriented person does not run such risks. In his circle it is taken for granted that one gets ‘in trouble’ with the police now and then; he need not fear losing his job since he works intermittently or not at all, and as for his wife and children, he contributes little or nothing to their support and they may well be better off without him.
” —Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy - the God That FailedThe first decades of the Inquisition’s operations were not as fully documented as they were after 1540, but historians now agree that these were its bloodiest days and that perhaps as many as fifteen hundred people may have been executed, or about thirty a year. Turning to the fully recorded period, of the 44,701 cases tried, only 826 people were executed, which amounts to 1.8 percent of those brought to trial. Together, this adds up to a total of about 2,300 deaths spread over more than two centuries, a total that is a far cry from the ‘conservative’ estimates that more than thirty thousand were burned by the Inquisition.
In fact, fewer people were executed by order of the Spanish Inquisition over more than two centuries than the three thousand French Calvinists who were killed in Paris alone during the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. Or compare this with the thousands of English Lutherans, Lollards, and Catholics (in addition to two of his wives) that Henry VIII is credited with having boiled, burned, beheaded, or hanged. The fact is that during the entire period 1480 through 1700, only about ten deaths per year were meted out by the Inquisition all across Spain — and usually to repeat offenders! By modern Western standards, of course, even ten executions a year for various acts of religious nonconformity seem a dreadful excess. But during the time in question there was no religious toleration anywhere in Europe and capital punishment was the norm for all offenses, religious or otherwise. In context, then, the Spanish Inquisition was remarkably restrained.
” —Rodney Stark, The Triumph of Christianity : How the Jesus Movement Became the World’s Largest ReligionAs further evidence of the acute shortage of women, it was common for them to marry again and again, not only following the death of a husband, but also after their husbands had divorced them. In fact, state policy penalized women under fifty who did not remarry, so ‘second and third marriages became common,’ especially since most women married men far older than themselves. Tullia, Cicero’s daughter ‘was not untypical… married at 16… widowed at 22, remarried at 23, divorced at 28; married again at 29, divorced at 33 — and dead, soon after childbirth, at 34.’ Another woman was said to have married eight times within five years. Apparently, there always was a considerable surplus of marriageable men.
The best estimate is that there were 131 males per 100 females in Rome, rising to 140 males per 100 females in the rest of Italy, Asia Minor, and North Africa. In contrast, the growing Christian communities did not have their sex ratios distorted by female infanticide, on top of which they enjoyed an excess of women to men based on the gender difference in conversion.
This would have resulted in very substantial differences in overall fertility between pagans and Christians even had the average woman in each group had the same number of children. If women made up 43 percent of the pagan population of Rome (assuming a ratio of 131 males to 100 females), and if each bore four children, that would be 172 infants per 100 pagans, making no allowance for exposure or infant mortality. But if women made up, say, 55 percent of the Christian population (which may well be low), that would be 220 infants per 100 Christians — a difference of 48 infants. Such differences would have resulted in substantial annual increases in the proportion of the population who were Christians, even if everything else were equal.
But there are compelling reasons to accept the testimony of ancient historians, philosophers, senators, and emperors that everything else was not equal, that the average fertility of pagan women was so low as to have resulted in a declining population, thus necessitating the admission of ‘barbarians’ as settlers of empty estates in the empire and especially to fill the army. The primary reason for low Roman fertility was that men did not want the burden of families and acted accordingly: many avoided fertility by having sex with prostitutes rather than with their wives, or by engang in anal intercourse. Many had their wives employ various means of contraception which were far more effective than had been thought until recently; and they had many infants exposed.
Pagan husbands also often forced their wives to have abortions—which also added to female mortality and often resulted in subsequent infertility. Consider the instructions the famous Roman medical writer Aulas Cornelius Celsus offered to surgeons in the first century. Having warned that an abortion ‘requires extreme caution and neatness, and entails very great risk,’ he advised that the surgeon first kill the fetus with a long needle or spike and then force his ‘greased hand’ up the vagina and into the uterus (there was no anesthesia). If the fetus is in a headfirst position, the surgeon should then insert a smooth hook and fix it ‘into an eye or ear or the mouth, even at times into the forehead, and then this is pulled upon and extracts the foetus.’ If the fetus was positioned crosswise or backward, then Celsus advised that a blade be used to cut up the fetus within the womb so it could be taken out in pieces. Afterward, Celsus instructed surgeons to tie the woman’s thighs together and to cover her pubic area with ‘greasy wool, dipped in vinegar and rose oil.’
[…]
Both Plato and Aristotle linked their positions on abortion to threats of overpopulation, but that was not the situation in the Roman Empire in the days of early Christianity. Rome was threatened by a declining population and, consequently, there was much concern to increase fertility. In 59 BCE Julius Caesar secured legislation giving land to fathers of three or more children (he himself had only one legitimate child, but many bastards, one with Cleopatra). Cicero proposed that celibacy be outlawed, but the Senate did not support him. In 9 CE Augustus promulgated laws giving political advantages to men who fathered three or more children and imposing political and financial penalties on childless couples, unmarried women over the age of twenty, and upon unmarried men over the age of twenty-five. Most subsequent emperors continued these policies and Trajan even provided substantial subsidies for children. But nothing worked. By the start of the Christian era, Greco-Roman fertility had fallen below replacement levels so that by the third century CE there is solid evidence of decline in both the number and the populations of Roman towns in the West.” —Rodney Stark, The Triumph of Christianity : How the Jesus Movement Became the World’s Largest Religion
Instead, as the centuries passed most people continued to live as they always had, ‘just a notch above barest subsistence… little better off than their oxen.’ Of course, as much as half of the population of the empire consisted of slaves who, in effect, were oxen. But even most free Romans lived at a bare subsistence level, not because they lacked the potential to achieve a much higher standard of living, but because a predatory ruling elite extracted every ounce of ‘surplus’ production. If all production above the bare minimum needed for survival is seized by the elite, there is no motivation for anyone to produce more. Consequently, despite the fabulous wealth of the elite, Rome was very poor. As E. L. Jones noted, ‘emperors amassed vast wealth but received incomes that were nevertheless small relative to the immensity of the territories and populations governed.’
When the collapse of the Roman Empire ‘released the tax-paying millions… from a paralysing oppression,’ many new technologies began to appear and were rapidly and widely adopted with the result that ordinary people were able to live far better, and, after centuries of decline under Rome, the population began to grow again. No longer were the productive classes bled to sustain the astonishing excesses of the Roman elite, or to erect massive monuments to imperial egos, or to support vast armies to hold Rome’s many colonies in thrall. Instead, human effort and ingenuity turned to better ways to farm, to sail, to transport goods, to conduct business, to build churches, to make war, to educate, and even to play music.
But because so many centuries later a number of examples of classical Greek and Roman public grandeur still stand as remarkable ruins, many intellectuals have been prompted to mourn the loss of these ‘great civilizations.’ Many who are fully aware of what this grandeur cost in human suffering have been quite willing even to write-off slavery as merely ‘the sacrifice which had to be paid for this achievement.’ To put it plainly, for too long too many historians have been as gullible as tourists, gaping at the monuments, palaces, and conspicuous consumption of Rome, and then drawing invidious comparisons between such ‘cosmopolitan’ places and ‘provincial’ communities such as medieval merchant towns.
In any event, there was no ‘fall’ into ‘Dark Ages.’ Instead, once freed of the bondage of Rome, Europe separated into hundreds of independent ‘statelets.’ In many of these societies progress and increased production became profitable, and that ushered in ‘one of the great innovative eras of mankind,’ as technology was developed and put into use ‘on a scale no civilization had previously known.’ In fact, it was during the ‘Dark Ages’ that Europe took the great technological and intellectual leap forward that put it ahead of the rest of the world. How could historians have so misrepresented things?
In part, the notion that Europe fell into the ‘Dark Ages’ was a hoax perpetrated by very antireligious intellectuals such as Voltaire and Gibbon, who were determined to claim that theirs was the era of ‘Enlightenment.’ Another factor was that intellectuals too often have no interest in anything but literary matters. It is quite true that after the fall of Rome, educated Europeans did not write nearly as elegant Latin as had the best Roman writers. For many, that was sufficient cause to regard this as a backward time.” —Rodney Stark, The Triumph of Christianity : How the Jesus Movement Became the World’s Largest Religion
‘Stand by the ways and see and ask for the ancient paths,
Where the good way is, and walk in it;
And you will find rest for your souls.’” —Jeremiah 6:16
Egalitarianism, as we have already intimated, cannot make much progress without the use of force: Perfect equality, naturally, is only possible in total slavery. Since nature (and naturalness, implying also freedom from artificial constraints) has no bias against even gross inequalities, force must be used to establish equality. Imagine the average class of students in a boarding school, endowed with the normal variety of talents, interests, and inclinations for hard work. The powerful and dictatorial principal of the school insists that all students of the class should score Bs in a given subject. This would mean that those who earned C, D, or E would be made to work harder, some so hard that they would collapse. Then there would be the problem of the A students whom one would have to restrain, giving them intoxicating drinks or locking them up every day with copies of Playboy or The New Masses. The simplest way would probably be to hit them over the head. Force would have to be used, as Procrustes used it. But the use of force limits and in most cases destroys freedom.
A ‘free’ landscape has hills and valleys. To make an ‘egalitarian’ landscape one would have to blow off the tops of the mountains and fill the valleys with rubble. To get an even hedge, one has to clip it regularly. To equalize wealth (which so many ‘progressive’ countries on either side of the Iron Curtain are now doing) one would have to pay ‘equal wages and salaries,’ or tax the surplus away — to the extent that those earning above the average would refuse additional work. Since these are usually gifted people with stamina and ideas, their refusal has a paralyzing effect on the commonweal.
In other words, there is a real antagonism, an incompatibility, a mutual exclusiveness between liberty and enforced equality. This is a curious situation if we remember that in the popular mind these two concepts are closely linked. Is this only due to the fact that the French Revolution chose as its slogan ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’ - or is there another reason?
” —Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Leftism: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Marcuse